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ARTICLES
DISMISSAL OF CALIFORNIA PUBLIC
SCHOOL EMPLOYEES ENGAGED IN UNION
ACTIVITY
Ronald D. Wenkart*
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) was enacted
by Congress to guarantee the right of workers to organize col-
lectively, form labor unions, and bargain collectively with
their employers.1 At common law no such right had existed.'
The NLRA was also designed to prevent employer discrimina-
tion against employees engaged in union activity.' A large
number of the unfair labor practice charges filed with the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board (NLRB) involved allegations of
employer discrimination against employees for engaging in
union activities.4
The language of the Educational Employment Relations
Act (EERA), or Rodda Act, is patterned after the language of
the NLRA.5 The EERA regulates labor relations in the public
schools and community colleges of California much as the
NLRA regulates labor relations in the private sector. The
EERA also seeks to promote improved employer-employee re-
lations and guarantee the right to organize, form, and join la-
bor unions, and the right to bargain collectively with public
school employers.' The California Legislature enacted the
* 1982 by Ronald D. Wenkart
* B.A. 1973, California State University, Northridge; J.D. 1977, San Fernando
Valley College of Law. Mr. Wenkart is counsel for Schools Legal Services in Bakers-
field, California.
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-166 (1958 & Supp. IV 1976).
2. See GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW 1-6 (1976).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1976).
4. See Samoff, NLRB Priority and Injunctions for Discriminatory Discharges,
31 LAB. L.J. 54 (1980).
5. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 3540-3549.3 (Deering 1982).
6. Id. at § 3540.
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EERA to prevent the discharge or dismissal of public school
employees for organizing labor unions or engaging in other
union activities. Without such a prohibition, workers would be
fearful of engaging in union activities.7 The California Legisla-
ture, however, did not intend (nor did Congress intend) to
prevent the lawful discharge or dismissal of employees simply
because the employees were union members or may have been
engaged in union activity.' Neither the California Legislature
nor Congress sought to prevent an employer from discharging
an employee or to interfere with the employer's rights to man-
age his enterprise, be it public or private.9
To determine whether an employee has been discharged
for lawful reasons, the courts, the NLRB, and the California
Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) have adopted
"tests" which balance the competing interests of the employer
and employee. The PERB test, however, is significantly differ-
ent than that of the courts and the NLRB. This article will
analyze the respective tests and discuss how each balances the
competing interests.
I. THE "TEST" IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR-NLRB AND
FEDERAL COURT PRECEDENTS
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) protects the
right of workers to engage in union activities by making it an
unfair labor practice, under section 158(a)(1), for an employer
to "interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exer-
cise of the rights guaranteed in Section 157 .. ."1O or, under
section 158(a)(3), for an employer "by discrimination in re-
gard to hire or tenure or employment or any term or condition
of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any
labor organization . . . ." Section 157 grants to employees
the right to self-organization, the right to form, join or assist
labor organizations, the right to bargain collectively, and the
right to engage in concerted activities (e.g., strikes)."2 The
7. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3543.5 (Deering 1982).
8. American Shipbuilding Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965); Maritori Bros.
Distributors v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd., 29 Cal. 3d 721, 631 P.2d 60, 175 Cal.
Rptr. 626 (1981).
9. See supra note 8.
10. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976).
11. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976).
12. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
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statutory language does not specify how discrimination is to
be determined. Employees would argue that the statute pro-
hibits employers from discharging employees solely for their
participation in union activities. Employers argue that they
have the inherent right to efficiently manage their businesses
and public agencies and should not be prevented from dis-
missing inefficient, unproductive, or insolent employees.
The United States Supreme Court, in American Ship
Building v. NLRB,' s enunciated the role of the courts in de-
termining whether discriminatory conduct had occurred:
[W]hen the employer discharges a union leader who has
broken shop rules, the problem posed is to determine
whether the employer has acted purely in disinterested
defense of shop discipline or has sought to damage em-
ployee organization. It is likely that the discharge will
naturally tend to discourage union membership in both
cases because of the loss of union leadership and the em-
ployees, suspicion of the employer's true intention. But
we have consistently construed the section to leave un-
scathed a wide range of employer actions taken to serve
legitimate business interests in some significant fashion,
even though the act committed may tend to discourage
union membership . . . . Such a construction of Section
8(a)(3) [Section 158(a)(3)] is essential if due protection
is to be accorded the employer's right to manage his
enterprise."
The Courts have imposed qualifications on the seemingly
unqualified language of section 158(a)(1) as well as on section
158(a)(3)."5 Under section 158(a)(1), a showing of intent or
anti-union animus on the part of the employer may be re-
quired where the employer asserts a legitimate and substan-
tial justification for his actions.1 6 The United States Supreme
Court, in NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc.," stated:
The statutory language "discrimination . . . to . . . dis-
courage . . ." means that the finding of a violation nor-
mally turns on whether the discriminatory conduct was
motivated by an antiunion purpose .... Some conduct,
13. 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
14. Id. at 311 (emphasis added).
15. See GORMAN, supra note 2, at 133.
16. NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967).
17. Id.
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however, is so "inherently destructive of employee inter-
ests" that it may be deemed proscribed without need for
proof of an improper motive .... If the conduct in ques-
tion falls within this "inherently destructive" category,
the employer has the burden of explaining away, justify-
ing or characterizing "his actions as something different
than they appear on their face" and if he fails, "an unfair
labor practice charge is made out.""
The employee does not need to prove an improper motive
when the employer's conduct is "inherently destructive" of
employee rights. The burden of proof is merely shifted to the
employer, who may still justify his conduct. The courts have
not specifically defined "inherently destructive," but they
have held that the granting of "super-seniority" or the pay-
ment of extraordinary benefits to nonstrikers is "inherently
destructive.' 9 Discharge or dismissal cases (including layoffs
and transfers) have not been held to be "inherently destruc-
tive" of employee rights.20 Despite the fact that discharge may
tend to discourage union membership, courts perceive a
greater need to protect the employer's right to manage its en-
terprise and make legitimate business decisions."
The courts have held that in discharge cases, anti-union
animus must be the motivating or dominant factor for the dis-
charge and that "but for" the employee's union activities he
would not have been discharged.2 The Ninth Circuit in
L'Eggs Products, Inc. v. NLRB., 3 stated: "An employer may
discharge an employee for good cause, bad cause, or no cause
18. Id. at 33.
19. See NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967); NLRB v. Erie
Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
20. American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965); Berry Schools v.
NLRB, 627 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1980); NLRB v. Adams Delivery Service, 623 F.2d 96(9th Cir. 1980); L'Eggs Products, Inc. v. NLRB, 619 F.2d 96 (9th Cir. 1980); Stephen-
son v. NLRB, 614 F.2d 1210 (9th Cir. 1980); NLRB v. Federal Pacific Electric Co.,
441 F.2d 765 (5th Cir. 1971); NLRB v. Century Broadcasting Corp., 419 F.2d 771 (8th
Cir. 1969); NLRB v. Materials Transportation Co., 412 F.2d 1074 (5th Cir. 1969);
Reading & Bates, Inc. v. NLRB, 403 F.2d 9 (5th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Red Top Cab &
Baggage Co., 383 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1967); NLRB v. 0. A. Fuller Super Markets, Inc.,
374 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Superior Sales, Inc., 366 F.2d 229 (8th Cir.
1966); NLRB v. Ace Comb Co., 342 F.2d 841 (8th Cir. 1965).
21. 380 U.S. 300, 311 (1965).
22. NLRB v. Adams Delivery Service, 623 F.2d 96 (9th Cir. 1980); L'Eggs, Inc.
v. NLRB, 619 F.2d 1337 (9th Cir. 1980); Stephenson v. NLRB, 614 F.2d 1210 (9th
Cir. 1980); NLRB v. 0. A. Fuller Super Markets, Inc., 374 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1967).
23. 619 F.2d 1337 (9th Cir. 1980).
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at all. . . as long as his motivation is not antiunion discrimi-
nation.. . . it follows that the board [NLRB] has the burden
of proving that a discharge was motivated by antiunion ani-
mus."24 In NLRB v. Adams Delivery Service, Inc.," the Ninth
Circuit held, "[iun reviewing the propriety of an employee dis-
charge ... we inquire whether anti-union animus was the
moving cause of the discharge; in essence whether the anti-
union animus was the 'but-for' cause of the discharge.""
The Fifth Circuit also uses the motivating factor and
"but for" test. In NLRB v. 0. A. Fuller Super Markets, Inc.,7
the court stated:
[A] discriminatory act on the part of the employer is not
in itself unlawful unless intended to prejudice an em-
ployee's position because of his union activity, i.e., some
element of the antiunion animus is necessary.. . . Thus,
in controversies involving employee discharges, the mo-
tive of the employer is the controlling factor ... and, ab-
sent a showing of antiunion motivation, an employer may
discharge an employee for a good reason, a bad reason, or
no reason at all ... if the specific employee happens to
be both inefficient and engaged in union activities, that
coincidence standing alone is insufficient to destroy the
just cause for his discharge..
In Reading & Bates, Inc. v. NLRB," the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals stated:
If the employee's misdeeds are so flagrant that he would
almost certainly have been fired regardless of anti-union
animus, then there is no 'discrimination' . . . the board
[NLRB] may look to the employer's intent or the domi-
nant motive behind discharge to determine whether dis-
crimination has occurred. No . . .violation occurs ...
unless the employer acts discriminatorily with intent to
discourage union membership and such improper motive
is a cause without which the employee would not be
24. Id. at 1341. In California public schools, employees may only be dismissed
for cause. See CAL. EDuc. COD §§ 44932, 44949, 45113, 87732, 87740, 88013 (Deering
1978 & Supp. 1982).
25. 623 F.2d 96 (9th Cir. 1980).
26. Id. at 99.
27. 374 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1980).
28. Id. at 200.
29. 403 F.2d 9 (5th Cir. 1968).
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discharged. 0
The courts have held that it is not the role of the labor
relations agency to second-guess the employer's policies or ac-
tions or substitute its judgment for that of the employer."
The labor relations agency's role is to determine if the em-
ployer's dominant motivation was anti-union animus. The
agency's finding must be based on substantial evidence. Evi-
dence of the employer's general hostility toward unions or
mere suspicion of anti-union motivation is insufficient.32 The
Fifth Circuit summarized the applicable case law:
Management decisions are not subject to the second
guessing of the board [NLRB] or the Courts unless it is
shown by substantial evidence ... that the decision vio-
lates the Act [NLRA] ... an employer's general hostility
to unions without more, does not supply an unlawful mo-
tive as to discharges .... Business judgment cannot be
condemned merely because it coincides with anti-union
sentiment .... To show discrimination the board must
prove that the employee would have been treated differ-
ently in the absence of union activity. . ... 3
Thus, there must be substantial believable evidence on
the record to support an inference of unlawful employer moti-
vation. 4 Even seemingly harsh discharges are not unlawful
unless motivated by an intent to discourage union activity. 8
Other jurisdictions and the NLRB have adopted a similar
standard.8
The employer's knowledge of the employee's union activi-
ties is also essential to show discrimination due to union activ-
ities.8 7 Without proof that the employer had knowledge of the
30. Id. at 11.
31. See NLRB v. Materials Transportation Co., 412 F.2d 1074 (5th Cir. 1969);
NLRB v. Ace Comb Co., 342 F.2d 841 (8th Cir. 1965).
32. NLRB v. Materials Transportation Co., 412 F.2d 1074 (5th Cir. 1969).
33. Id. at 1078.
34. NLRB v. Federal Pacific Electric Co., 441 F.2d 765, 770 (5th Cir. 1971).
35. Id.
36. See, e.g., Columbia County Bd. of Public Instruction v. Public Employees
Relations Comm'n, 353 So. 2d 127 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Pasco County School
Board v. Florida Public Employees Relations Comm'n, 353 So. 2d 108 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1977); Martori Bros. Distributors v. Agricultural Labor Relations Board, 29 Cal.
3d 721, 631 P.2d 60, 175 Cal. Rptr. 626 (1981); Wright Line, a Division of Wright
Line, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980).
37. L'Eggs Products, Inc. v. NLRB, 619 F.2d 1337, 1341 (9th Cir. 1980); NLRB
v. Century Broadcasting Co.,. 419 F.2d 771, 778 (8th Cir. 1969).
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employee's union activities, discriminatory conduct cannot be
found. 8 In NLRB v. Century Broadcasting Company,3 ' the
Eighth Circuit noted: "Absent knowledge of union activity,
the Company could not have been motivated . .. by anti-
union animus. The near coincidence .. .with union activity
without more, is not substantially indicative of a discrimina-
tory motive."
4 0
In summary, the case law interpreting the National Labor
Relations Act has held that, in discharge cases, to sustain an
unfair labor practice charge which alleges employer discrimi-
nation due to an employee's union activity, anti-union motiva-
tion on the part of the employer must be found. The em-
ployer's knowledge of the employee's union activities must be
established by substantial evidence, and it must be shown by
a preponderance of the evidence"1 that "but for" the em-
ployee's union activities, he would not have been discharged.
II. CALIFORNIA AGRICULTURAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
PRECEDENTS-ADOPTION OF FEDERAL PRECEDENTS
The language of the California Agricultural Labor Rela-
tions Act (ALRA) 4' is virtually identical to the language of the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). 8 Section 1153 of the
California Labor Code states in part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an agricultural em-
ployer to do any of the following: (a) To interfere with,
restrain, or coerce agricultural employees in the exercise
of their rights guaranteed in Section 1152.. . . (c) By dis-
crimination in regard to the hiring or tenure of employ-
ment or any term or condition of employment, to en-
courage or discourage membership in any labor
38. NLRB v. Century Broadcasting Co., 419 F.2d 771, 777 (8th Cir. 1969).
39. NLRB v. Century Broadcasting Co., 419 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1969).
40. Id. at 778 (quoting NLRB v. South Rambler Co., 324 F.2d 447, 449-50 (8th
Cir. 1963)).
41. L'Eggs Products, Inc. v. NLRB, 619 F.2d 1337, 1341 (9th Cir. 1980); NLRB
v. Century Broadcasting Corp., 419 F.2d 771, 777-79 (8th Cir. 1969); NLRB v. Materi-
als Transportation Co., 412 F.2d 1074, 1078 (5th Cir. 1969); NLRB v. Superior Sales,
Inc., 366 F.2d 229 (8th Cir. 1966); NLRB v. Ace Comb Co., 342 F.2d 841 (8th Cir.
1965). See also CAL. ADMIN. CODE § 32178 (1980).
42. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1140-1166.3 (Deering 1976 & Supp. 1982).
43. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-166 (1976). Both statutory schemes utilize the phrase "in
the exercise of rights guaranteed."
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organization... .4
The rights guaranteed in section 1153 are virtually indistin-
guishable from the rights guaranteed under section 157 of the
NLRA. Both acts guarantee the right of employees to self-or-
ganize, the right to form, join, and support labor organizations
and the right to engage in concerted activities.
The California Supreme Court, in Martori Brothers Dis-
tributors v. Agricultural Labor Relations Board,4 5 interpret-
ing the language of California Labor Code section 1153,
adopted the "but for" test formulated by the federal courts
and the NLRB under the National Labor Relations Act.4 The
court stated that, "[i]n the absence of union discrimination,
the purpose of labor legislation does not vest in the adminis-
trative board any control over an employer's business policies.
. ..The mere fact that an employee is or was participating in
union activities does not insulate him from immunity from
routine employment decisions."'47
Furthermore, the court in Martori Brothers stated that
when an employer is motivated by both an anti-union bias
and a legitimate business interest, the discharge of an em-
ployee will be upheld unless it can be shown that "but for"
the employee's union activities he would not have been dis-
missed.' In effect, if it is found that the employee would have
been discharged in the absence of union activities or if the
union activities were disregarded, the discharge will be up-
held. The court directed the ALRB to apply the "but for" test
in all future cases.'
III. DECISIONS OF THE CALIFORNIA PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT
RELATIONS BOARD-CONFLICT WITH STATE AND FEDERAL CASE
LAW
The language of the Educational Employment Relations
Act (EERA)50 is similar but not identical to the language con-
44. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1153 (Deering 1976).
45. 29 Cal. 3d 721, 631 P.2d 60, 175 Cal. Rptr. 626 (1981).
46. Id. See also Wright Line, a Division of Wright Line, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 1083(1980).
47. 29 Cal. 3d at 729, 631 P.2d at 64, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 630.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 730, 631 P.2d at 65, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 631.
50. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§. 3540-3549.3 (Deering 1982).
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tained in the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)' and the
Agricultural Labor Relations Act (ALRA).52 While both the
NLRA and ALRA employ the phrase "in the exercise of their
right guaranteed . . .,"5s the EERA utilizes the phrase "be-
cause of their exercise of rights guaranteed."' The rights
guaranteed in section 3543.5 of the EERA are enumerated in
section 3543. These rights include the right to form, join and
participate in union activities, the right not to form, join or
participate in union activities, and the right of employees to
represent themselves individually under certain
circumstances.55
The California Public Employment Relations Board
(PERB) was created by the legislature to administer the
EERA.' The Board is empowered to investigate unfair labor
practice charges and make determinations as to whether a vio-
lation of the act has occurred.57 In adjudicating unfair labor
practice charges, the PERB must adopt a preliminary con-
struction or interpretation of the act it is administering;"
however, it is the duty of the court to render a final determi-
nation as to the meaning of a statute."9
The PERB, interpreting the language of section
3543.5(a), first held that the legislature's use of language of
causation rather than the broader language of the NLRA and
ALRA indicated a more restrictive legislative intent.60 The
PERB in San Dieguito Union High School District stated:
51. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158-166 (1976).
52. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1140-1166.3 (Deering 1976 & Supp. 1982).
53. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976); CAL. LAB. CODE § 1153(a) (Deering 1976).
54. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3543.5 (Deering 1982) states: "It shall be unlawful for a
public school employer to: (a) Impose or threaten to impose reprisals on employees to
discriminate or threaten to discriminate against employees or otherwise interfere
with, restrain or coerce employees because of the exercise of rights guaranteed by this
chapter. . . ." (emphasis added).
55. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3543 (Deering 1982).
56. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 3541-341.3 (Deering 1982).
57. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3541(i) (Deering 1982).
58. Bodinson Mfg. Company v. California Employment Commission, 17 Cal. 2d
321, 109 P.2d 935, 939 (1941). The court in Bodinson held that although an adminis-
trative agency charged with the responsibility of administering a statute must adopt a
preliminary construction of the statute, such administrative interpretation is not a
final one. It is the constitutional duty of the court to state the true meaning of a
statute.
59. Id.
60. See San Dieguito Union High School District, EERB Decision No. 22, 1
Pub. Empl. Rep. Cal. (Lab. Relations Press) 369 (1977).
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"Unlike ... the NLRA, Government Code Section 3543.5(a)
seems to make motive or purpose a requirement for a viola-
tion.. . . Interference 'because of' is quite different from mere
'interference in'. 'Because of' connotes purposeful or inten-
tional behavior; 'interference in' connotes interference with or
without an unlawful intent. 161
After the PERB decision in San Dieguito, the NLRB in-
terpreted the less restrictive language of the NLRA to require
an examination of the employer's motive in discharge cases
and determined that when a lawful business motive existed
the employee must prove that "but for" his union activities he
would not have been dismissed."' The PERB later reversed
itself in Carlsbad Unified School District" and adopted a
broader interpretation of the EERA than had been adopted
by the NLRB and the courts in interpreting the language of
the NLRA.
The PERB misconstrued the applicable NLRB prece-
dents when it stated: "While unlawful intent appears not to
be a necessary element of an interference charge under 8(a)(1)[29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1)], it has generally been held to be a neces-
sary ingredient in finding a violation of Section 8(a)(3) [29
U.S.C. Section 158(a)(3)]."' In fact, even under the seemingly
unqualified language of section 158(a)(1) the courts have im-
posed qualifications.6 Federal case law has held that under
section 158(a)(1), 66 intent or anti-union motivation by the em-
ployer must be proven where the employer asserts a legitimate
and substantial justification for his actions.2 Under section
61. Id. at 373.
62. See Wright Line, a Division of Wright Line, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980);
Martori Brothers Distributors v. Agricultural Labor Relations Board, 29 Cal. 3d 721,
631 P.2d 60, 175 Cal. Rptr. 626 (1981).
63. PERB Decision No. 89, 3 Pub. Empl. Rep. Cal. (Lab. Relations Press) 369
(1977).
64. Id. at 108.
65. See GORMAN, supra note 2, at 133.
In effect, Section 8(a)(1) [§ 158(a)(1)] could be written as follows: It
shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to take action which,
regardless of the absence of anti-union bias, tends to interfere with, re-
strain or coerce a reasonable employee in the exercise of rights guaran-
teed in Section 7 [29 U.S.C. § 1571], provided that action lacks a legiti-
mate and substantial justification. .
Id.
66. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976).
67. See NLRB v. Great.Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 33-34 (1967).
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158(a)(3),8 the courts have held that intent or anti-union mo-
tivation must be shown in order to sustain a violation.9 In
cases of discharge or dismissal, intent or anti-union motiva-
tion must also be proven. 0
The Carlsbad test is less stringent than the NLRB test
despite the more restrictive language of the EERA. The
PERB explained its adoption of a standard which varied
markedly from the NLRB by stating:
The N.L.R.A. was designed for labor relations in the
private sector. PERB will remain open to the possibilities
that there may be inherent and necessary distinctions to
be drawn for public employment relations in California.
Furthermore, the persuasiveness of federal adjudication is
mitigated . . . by specific distinctions between the lan-
guage of the respective statutes.
The "because of" language should not be so narrowly
read as to preclude one whose rights have been damaged
from seeking redress unless intentional harm can be
demonstrated. PERB understands that brief phrase to
mean only that some nexus must exist between the exer-
cise of employee rights under the EERA and the actions
68. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976).
69. American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965); NLRB v.
Brown, 380 U.S. 278 (1965); Textile Workers Union of America v. Darlington Manu-
facturing Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965); Radio Officer's Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17
(1954); Berry Schools v. NLRB, 627 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1980); NLRB v. Adams Deliv-
ery Service, 623 F.2d 96 (9th Cir. 1980); Stephenson v. NLRB, 614 F.2d 1210 (9th Cir.
1980); L'Eggs Products Inc. v. NLRB, 619 F.2d 1337 (9th Cir. 1980); NLRB v. Fed-
eral Pacific Electric Co., 441 F.2d 765 (5th Cir. 1971); NLRB v. Century Broadcasting
Corp., 419 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1969); NLRB v. Materials Transportation Co., 412 F.2d
1074 (5th Cir. 1969); Reading & Bates, Inc. v. NLRB, 403 F.2d 9 (5th Cir. 1968);
NLRB v. Red Top Cab and Baggage Co., 383 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1967); NLRB v. 0. A.
Fuller Super Markets, Inc., 374 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Superior Sales,
Inc., 366 F.2d 229 (8th Cir. 1966); NLRB v. Ace Comb Co., 342 F.2d 841 (8th Cir.
1965).
70. American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965); Berry Schools v.
NLRB, 627 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1980); NLRB v. Adams Delivery Service, 623 F.2d 96
(9th Cir. 1980); L'Eggs Products, Inc. v. NLRB, 619 F.2d 1337 (9th Cir. 1980); Ste-
phenson v. NLRB, 614 F.2d 1210 (9th Cir. 1980); NLRB v. Federal Pacific Electric
Co., 441 F.2d 765 (5th Cir. 1971); NLRB v. Century Broadcasting Corp., 419 F.2d 771
(8th Cir. 1969); NLRB v. Materials Transportation Co., 412 F.2d 1074 (5th Cir. 1969);
Reading & Bates, Inc. v. NLRB, 403 F.2d 9 (5th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Red Top Cab
and Baggage Co., 383 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1967); NLRB v. 0. A. Fuller Super Markets,
Inc., 374 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Superior Sales, Inc., 366 F.2d 229 (8th
Cir. 1966); NLRB v. Ace Comb Co., 342 F.2d 841 (8th Cir. 1965).
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of the employer .... 71
In Carlsbad, the PERB set forth a "single test" for viola-
tions of Section 3543(a) as follows:
1. A single test shall be applicable in all instances in
which violations of Section 3543.5(a) are alleged;
2. Where the charging party establishes that the em-
ployer's conduct tends to or does result in some harm to
employee rights granted under the EERA, a prima facie
case shall be deemed to exist;
3. Where the harm to the employee's rights is slight, and
the employer offers justification based on operational ne-
cessity, the competing interest of the employer and the
rights of the employees will be balanced and the charge
resolved accordingly;
4. Where the harm is inherently destructive of employee
rights, the employer's conduct will be excused only on
proof that it was occasioned by circumstances beyond the
employer's control and that no alternative course of ac-
tion was available;
5. Irrespective of the foregoing, a charge will be sustained
where it is shown that the employer would not have en-
gaged in the complained-of conduct but for an unlawful
motivation, purpose or intent.7 s
The PERB's test is, in reality, three or four separate tests
and is quite different from the standard used by the NLRB
and the courts. The PERB test shifts more of the burden of
proof to the employer, away from the employee. Part two of
the test states that a prima facie case is established by the
employee when the employee shows that the employer's con-
duct results in some harm to the employee's right granted
under the EERA.7 Once a prima facie case is established by
the employee, the PERB (under parts three and four of the
test) looks to see if the harm to the employee's rights is slight
or inherently destructive. If the harm is slight and the em-
ployer offers evidence of operational necessity, then the
PERB will balance the competing interests of the employer
and employee. If the harm is inherently destructive, the em-
ployer will have violated the EERA, unless the employer can
71. PERB Decision No. 89, 3 Pub. Empl. Rep. Cal. (Lab. Relations Press)
10031, at 108.
72. Id. at 108-09.
73. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3543 (Deering 1982).
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show that his conduct was beyond his control and no alterna-
tive course was available.
Under the PERB test, a determination as to whether an
employer's conduct is inherently destructive of employee
rights is critical. If it is found that the employer's conduct is
inherently destructive, the employer faces the virtually insur-
mountable task of justifying his conduct. In discharge cases, it
would be untenable for an employer to argue that the dismis-
sal of an employee was beyond his control. The case law and
NLRB precedent, however, clearly indicate that the discharge
of an employee is not inherently destructive of employee
rights.7 ' Only the granting of "super seniority" and the pay-
ment of extraordinary benefits to non-strikers have been held
to be inherently destructive of employee rights.75
If the PERB finds that, in discharge cases, the harm to
employee rights is slight, then the interests of the employee
and employer are balanced. The employer's interest in manag-
ing his enterprise is balanced against the employee's right to
engage in union activities even when the employer has offered
proof of operational necessity (e.g., enforcement of shop rules,
insubordination of employee) to justify his actions.
In NLRB v. Great Dane,7 the United States Supreme
Court adopted a different test to be applied where the harm
to the employee's rights is slight. The Court stated: "When
the resulting harm to employee rights is . . . comparatively
slight and a substantial and legitimate business end is served,
the employer's conduct is prima facie lawful and an affirma-
tive showing of improper motivation must be made."' 7 That
is, "if the adverse effect of the . . . conduct on employee
rights is 'comparatively slight' an anti-union motivation must
be proved to sustain the charge . ".e78 The PERB test seems
to eliminate the need for the employee to prove unlawful mo-
tivation by the employer. In this respect, the PERB test dif-
74. See NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967); American Ship
Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965); Martori Bros. Distributors, Inc. v. Agri-
cultural Labor Relations Bd., 29 Cal. 3d 721, 631 P.2d 60, 175 Cal. Rptr. 626 (1981);
Wright Line, a Division of Wright Line, Inc. 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980).
75. NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967); NLRB v. Erie Resis-
tor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
76. 388 U.S. 26 (1967).
77. Id. at 34 (quoting in part NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 289 (1965) and
citing with approval American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965)).
78. 388 U.S. at 34.
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fers markedly from the standard adopted by the California
Supreme Court in Martori Brothers.9
In Martori Brothers, the California Supreme Court held
that unlawful motivation by the employer is the key element
in the employee's burden of proof, and that where the em-
ployer has both lawful and unlawful motives for discharging
the employee, it must be shown that the employee would not
have been discharged "but for" the anti-union motive.80 In ef-
fect, the anti-union motive must be the moving cause or the
key factor in the discharge and the valid business reason must
be a pretext for discharge. 1 The Court explained the test as
follows:
When it appears that an employee was dismissed because
of combined valid business reasons as well as for invalid
reasons, such as union or other protected activities, the
question becomes whether the discharge would not have
occurred "but for" the protected activity.
When it is shown that the employee is guilty of mis-
conduct warranting discharge, the discharge should not
be deemed an unfair labor practice unless the board de-
termines that the employee would have been retained
"but for" his union membership or his performance of
other protected activities.82
Part five of the PERB test sets forth a "but for" test
which differs from the test inMartori Brothers. It must be
shown that the employer would not have engaged in the con-
duct alleged in the unfair labor practice charge "but for" an
unlawful motivation, purpose or intent. The PERB, however,
imposes the burden of proof on the employer. The employer
must show that he had no unlawful motive or intent and must
negate any evidence of such motive or intent offered by the
employee. 8" As a result, the PERB test would preclude the
employer from prevailing where dual motive actions are
found. In this respect, part five of the PERB test differs
markedly from the test adopted by the NLRB, the federal
79. 29 Cal. 3d 721, 631 P.2d 60, 175 Cal. Rptr. 626 (1981).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 730, 361 P.2d at 65, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 631.
82. Id. at 729-30, 361 P.2d at 64-65, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 630-31.
83. Carlsbad Unified School District, PERB Decision No. 89, 3 Pub. Empl. Rep.
Cal. (Labor Relations Press) 108-09 (1977).
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courts, and the California Supreme Court in Martori
Brothers.
In Martori Brothers, the California Supreme Court found
evidence of dual employer motivation yet found that the un-
lawful anti-union motives of the employer were not the "but
for" cause of employee's discharge. In other words, the em-
ployer would have discharged the employee for business rea-
sons regardless of the employer's anti-union motive. The court
cited the employee's involvement in a wage dispute with the
employer immediately preceding the discharge, the em-
ployee's testimony at ALRB hearings, and the employee's
filing of charges with the ALRB as evidence supporting a pos-
sible finding of anti-union motivation. 4 The court, however,
also cited the employee's insubordination, threats against the
employer and his family, and the employee's disruptive con-
duct as evidence which would justify discharge. 8 The ALRB
had rejected the employer's evidence as merely a "pretext" to
mask a discharge motivated by unlawful intent and anti-union
animus." The ALRB deemed it significant that the employee
was not dismissed immediately after making the threats. The
California Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Board's
finding of "pretext" or lack of sufficient business justification
and ordered the ALRB to apply the "but for" test.8 7 The
court explained its holding as follows:
Labor Code Section 1148 provides that "the board shall
follow applicable precedents of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act as amended." In light of the recent Wright Line
decision, the ALRB henceforth should apply this "but
for" standard in assessing the dual motive for discharge.
• . . When it is shown that the employee is guilty of mis-
conduct warranting discharge, the discharge should not
be deemed an unfair labor practice unless the board de-
termines that the employee would have been retained
"but for" his union membership or his performance of
other protected activities."
The PERB's decision in Carlsbad fails to take into con-
sideration that public school employees may only be dis-
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missed for cause8 ' and that an administrative hearing must be
held to dismiss an employee.' 0 These additional statutory pro-
tections, which employees in the private sector generally do
not have, further ensure that public school employees will
only be dismissed for cause based on business justification.
IV. CONCLUSION
The dismissal of public school employees in California
has been somewhat impeded by the decisions of the California
Public Employment Relations Board. The PERB standard for
determining whether employee union rights have been vio-
lated in discharge cases unfairly shifts the burden of proof to
the public school employer. This makes it more difficult for a
public school employer to discharge an insubordinate or in-
competent employee if the employee is a union member or has
engaged in union activity.
The United States Supreme Court, the California Su-
preme Court, and the National Labor Relations Board have
adopted a reasonable standard which balances the interests of
the employee and employer. The PERB, despite the more
narrowly drawn language of the EERA, has rejected that stan-
dard, except in cases where the harm to employee's right is
slight, and has adopted a broader test which shifts the burden
of proof from the employee to the employer. The PERB test
does not require an affirmative showing by the employee of
anti-union animus or intent by the employer but requires the
employer to show that no anti-union motive or intent was in-
volved in his business decision. In cases of undefined inher-
ently destructive behavior, the employer must meet an insur-
mountable burden of proof by showing that his conduct was
beyond his control. The PERB test unfairly downgrades the
employer's showing of business justification and thus hampers
the ability of public school employers to manage the taxpay-
ers' dollars efficiently.
When an employee in the private sector alleges a discrim-
inatory discharge due to union activity, the employee has the
burden of proving that unlawful anti-union intent was the
89. See CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 44932, 44949, 45113, 87732, 87740, 88013 (Deering
1978 & Supp. 1982).
90. See CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 44944, 44949, 45113, 87675, 87740, 88013 (Deering
1978 & Supp. 1982).
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moving cause behind his discharge, that any business justifica-
tion for the discharge asserted by the employer was a mere
pretext, and that there was no real business justification for
his discharge. The courts have adopted this standard in the
belief that labor relations legislation should not interfere with
the employer's business judgment or the efficient operation of
its enterprises.
Today's taxpayers expect and demand that their public
schools be efficiently managed. The PERB's decision in Carls-
bad impairs the ability of public school employers to manage
the public schools efficiently. Public school employees enjoy
other statutory protections which insulate them from arbi-
trary discharges. For these reasons, the PERB should apply
the "but for" standard which has been adopted by the federal
courts, the California Supreme Court and the National Labor
Relations Board.

